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U.S. money market yields up to one month have shown changes consistent with year-end 
liquidity preferences. I find that three- and six-month negotiable certificate of deposit 
(CD), Eurodollar deposit (ED), and banker’s acceptance (BA) yields are also affected by 
year-end liquidity preferences. Two- and three-month financial commercial paper (CP) 
yield changes are less pronounced. Banks – CD, ED, and BA issuers – have increased 
year-end liquidity needs, unlike finance companies – predominant CP issuers. The year-
end effect disappears after the 2007-2008 crisis as depositories’ cash holdings increase. 
CD, ED, and CP yields diverge post-crisis, suggesting that investors no longer consider 
them close substitutes. 
 




Standard explanations for the term structure of interest rates include: (1) 
expectations theory, (2) liquidity preference theory, and (3) market segmentation theory 
with its corollary of preferred habitats.  Modigliani and Sutch (1966) developed the 
preferred habitat theory to explain twists in the term structure of interest rates observed 
during the Kennedy Administration.  Later, Roll (1970, p.38) states that “(p)references 
for certain maturities occur because fixed-payment securities are used as hedges against 
the payment streams of assets or liabilities that must be held in the course of business but 
which entail risk of interest rate fluctuations that businessmen do not care to incur.”  
Ogden (1987) further notes that cash payment streams concentrate around the turn-of-the-
month with the largest concentration at the turn-of-the-year.  
Griffiths and Winters (1997) find that the yields of term repurchase agreements 
(repos) with maturities up to one month increase during the two days before the 
instrument’s maturity starts spanning the end of the year, remain high through the third-
to-last trading day of the year, and decline to “normal” levels on the last two days of the 
year. Griffiths and Winters (2005) find similar yield change patterns in one-month 
commercial paper, as well as bankers' acceptances, negotiable certificates of deposit, 
Eurodollar deposits, and U.S. dollar LIBOR. They argue that this effect is caused by 
investors with known year‐end cash obligations demanding money market instruments 
that mature prior to their cash obligation dates (which need not coincide with the last day 
of the year) in order to meet the obligations and dub it the year-end preferred habitat for 
liquidity. Kotomin, Smith and Winters (2008) extend Griffiths and Winters (2005) and 
find patterns consistent with the year-end preferred habitat for liquidity in one-week and 
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one-month LIBOR for the major world currencies (in addition to U.S. dollar) – Yen, 
Euro, German Mark, and Swiss Franc.  
I examine the behavior of yields of four classes of money market instruments that 
represent unsecured liabilities of U.S. financial institutions –  negotiable certificates of 
deposits (CDs), Eurodollar deposits (EDs), banker’s acceptances (BAs), and financial 
commercial paper (CP) – before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Before the crisis, CD, ED, and BA yields in maturities up to six months exhibit behavior 
consistent with a year-end preferred habitat for liquidity, while one-month, two-month, 
and three-month financial CP yield change patterns are similar but less pronounced, 
sometimes lacking statistical significance. It is likely related to the fact that CDs, EDs, 
and BAs are all liabilities of commercial banks, while financial CP issuers are dominated 
by captive finance companies. Commercial banks have an increased need for funds prior 
to the end of the year, driven by their customers’ year-end preferences for liquidity 
(Kotomin and Winters 2006), while finance companies are likely to have lower liquidity 
needs and more flexibility in choosing maturities of their short-term debt prior to the end 
of the year. After the financial crisis, the year-end effect is no longer observed. The likely 
reason is that in the wake of the 2007-2008 crisis, U.S. financial institutions, especially 
banks, increased holdings of cash so much that they easily meet seasonal liquidity needs. 
CD, ED, and CP yields diverge during and after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, 
indicating that investors no longer view these instruments as close substitutes.   




II. Calendar Timing Effects in the Money Market Instruments 
 Tax-loss selling and window dressing are routinely offered as explanations for the 
turn-of-the-year effect in equities.  Tax-loss selling does not apply to money market 
instruments because, absent default, money market instruments most often provide gains, 
and any realized losses caused by yield increases are small due to low sensitivity of 
prices to interest rates.  Musto (1997) offers flight-from-risk window dressing as an 
explanation for the higher U.S. commercial paper rates observed at the year-end. Flight-
from-risk window dressing is essentially an attempt by a financial institution to mislead 
investors and/or regulators by temporarily reducing riskiness of assets (e.g., by investing 
more in safer assets) prior to disclosure dates. Because window dressing is based on 
disclosure requirements, any effect caused by window dressing must span disclosure 
dates.  Griffiths and Winters (1997, 2005) show that the higher year-end rates in the U.S. 
money market do not persist across the year-end disclosure date and offer the year-end 
preferred habitat for liquidity to explain the observed rate pattern. 
 A preferred habitat for liquidity is based on investors’ preferences for instruments 
that mature before their cash obligation dates, so the funds are available to the investor to 
cover known cash obligations.  Ogden (1987) shows that large amounts of known cash 
obligations cluster around the year-end, and Griffiths and Winters (1997, 2005) note that 
these obligations need not align with the last trading day of the year. Thus, investors 
(lenders) with year-end preferences for liquidity withdraw from the money markets when 
the instruments’ maturity spans their cash obligation dates, which results in lower 
demand and higher yields for such securities.  Later, investors return to the instruments 
they exited previously, driving rates back down to normal, with the rate decline 
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beginning before the year-end disclosure date. Specifically, Griffiths and Winters (2005) 
report that various one-month private-issue U.S. money market instruments’ yields 
increase on the two days before the instrument’s maturity starts spanning the year-end 
(the last two days of November for a one-month maturity), remain at elevated levels 
throughout the third-to-last trading day of the year, and decline back to “normal” levels 
starting on the second-to-last trading day of the year. This pattern is consistent with 
investors wishing to retrieve their cash prior to the last two days of the year to pay cash 
obligations. Thus, to support a preferred habitat for liquidity, rates must increase before 
the instrument’s maturity begins spanning year-end cash obligation dates, remain high 
through the cash obligation dates, and return to normal levels after the cash obligation 
dates pass.   
The financial instruments studied – negotiable certificates of deposit, Eurodollar 
deposits, bankers’ acceptances, and financial commercial paper – are all unsecured 
liabilities of private U.S. financial institutions. Their yields must therefore include the 
risk-free rate, a term premium, a default premium, and a liquidity premium. Negotiable 
certificates of deposit (CDs) are time deposits issued by depository institutions (mostly 
banks) that are transferrable. That is, they can be traded in the secondary market before 
maturity. Most negotiable CDs have denominations of $1 million or more; smaller 
denominations are not as marketable and require higher yields. Because negotiable CD 
issue size exceeds the deposit insurance limit in the U.S., their yields reflect the current 
level of short-term rates, as well as issuing banks’ creditworthiness and size (larger banks 
are able to offer lower yields on their CDs since they may be perceived as better 
diversified and/or too big to fail).  
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Eurodollar deposits (EDs) are dollar-denominated time deposits held outside of 
the U.S. Non-personal time deposits (which include both negotiable CDs and EDs) are 
not subject to reserve requirements imposed on depository institutions by the Federal 
Reserve. Therefore, CDs and EDs may be close substitutes from the viewpoint of large, 
sophisticated U.S. banks that have access to international money markets. 
Banker’s acceptances (BAs), unlike CDs or EDs, originate from transactions of 
banks’ clients, usually in international trade, as opposed to being created from activities 
of the banks themselves. The following is a simplistic example of how BAs work. An 
importer of goods is not granted credit by an exporter and turns to its bank. The bank 
provides credit to the importer, who draws a time draft and agrees to pay the bank the 
face value of the draft by its maturity. The bank stamps the draft “accepted”, discounts it, 
and pays the importer the discounted value, which is used to purchase the goods. The 
bank may hold the acceptance in its portfolio or sell it at a discount to face value in the 
money market. At maturity, the importer pays the face value of the loan to its bank. 
Because BAs are preauthorized by letters of credit, if the importer defaults, the accepting 
bank makes the payment of the face value of the acceptance to the holder (unless it holds 
the acceptance itself). BAs have fallen out of active use by the end of the 1990s, and the 
Fed stopped reporting BA rates in 2000. Cyree, Lindley, and Winters (2007) find that 
BAs retained high liquidity even after they stopped playing a significant role in the U.S. 
money markets. 
Commercial paper (CP) is short-term debt of private corporations with maturities 
between one and 270 days. I collect rates for CP issued by financial institutions that is not 
asset-backed (so called financial CP). In the case of the banking industry, CP is issued at 
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the bank holding company level rather than at the individual bank level. However, the 
largest issuers of financial CP (as a group) are captive finance companies such as GE 
Capital or Caterpillar Financial.  
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 had a profound impact on the U.S. financial 
system in general and the money markets in particular. Large losses and failures of some 
financial institutions, bailouts of specific institutions and the entire financial system, and 
unprecedented measures taken by the Fed, including the zero interest-rate policy and 
paying interest on bank reserves, all made U.S. financial institutions more risk averse 
and/or more willing to hold cash. Therefore, the calendar effects studied herein may have 
changed (at least temporarily) due to the crisis. I investigate the differences in calendar-
time effects in the money market yields before, during, and after the crisis.  
 
III. Data and Methods 
Data 
The primary data are daily yields of private-issue U.S. money market instruments: 
negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs), Eurodollar deposits (EDs), banker’s acceptances 
(BAs), and financial commercial paper (CP). All of the data come from the Federal 
Reserve’s Release H.15 – Selected Interest Rates. The CD and ED yields are available for 
one-, three-, and six-month maturities, financial CP yields – for one-, two-, and three-
month maturities, and BA yields – for three- and six-month maturities. CD rates are 
averages of dealer offering rates on nationally traded CDs (i.e., secondary market data). 
BA rates represent yields for acceptances of highest-rated money center banks. ED yields 
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are computed from brokered transaction data collected by the Fed.1 CP rates are 
computed based on CP sales by dealers as well as direct sales by issuers to investors (i.e., 
CP rates are offer-side rates). The study period is from the beginning of 1991 through the 
end of 2011, subject to data availability. Financial CP yields are available from the 
beginning of 1997. 2 The Fed stopped collecting and reporting BA yields in the middle of 
2000, thus I use BA yields through the end of 1999. The sample begins in 1991 because 
in December 1990 Eurodollar deposits stopped being a subject to the reserve 
requirements imposed by the Fed on depository institutions.  
Three-month and six-month secondary market U.S. Treasury bill (T-bill) yields 
are collected to use as controls for the general level of interest rates in the U.S. money 
markets.3 Using T-bills of the same maturity as the private-issue instruments studied 
would be ideal; however, the one-month (or, more accurately, four-week) T-bills have 
been issued only since July 31, 2001. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the study 
period, 1991-2011. PH stands for preferred habitat and covers the period of increased 
yields identified by Griffiths and Winters (1997, 2005) – from the second-to-last day on 
which the instrument is both issued and matures before the end of the year (e.g., the 
second-to-last trading day of September for the three-month maturity) through the third-
to-last trading day of the year. Non-PH covers all the other days. Consistent with a year-
end preferred habitat for liquidity, higher spreads over T-bills are observed in the periods 
 
1 Another potential source of Eurodollar yields is the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) reported by 
the British Bankers Association (BBA). I use the Fed data because LIBOR has two disadvantages: (1) it 
represents an average of quotes, not actual transactions, and (2) it is based on a survey of only 16 banks, 
with the extreme quartiles dropped from the computation of the rate. 
2 The Fed changed the collection process of CP yields in 1997. Instead of reporting yields of dealer-placed 
and directly placed CP, it started reporting CP yields by issuer types: financial, nonfinancial, and asset-
backed. 
3 Using constant maturity T-bill yields instead of secondary market T-bill yields does not sensibly affect the 
results. 
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covered by PH in all four classes of private-issue instruments. Note that the T-bill yield 
being different in the PH versus the non-PH period is due to T-bill yields declining 
sharply over the crisis period, and not due to the reverse year-end preferred habitat effect 
in T-bills. The difference is much smaller and not statistically significant when tested 
over the pre-crisis period, 1991-2006. All the spreads of private-issue instruments over T-
bills in the next-to-last column remain statistically different in the PH versus the non-PH 
period at better than the 1% level when tested over the pre-crisis period. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Methods 
As discussed, the interest rate regularity for a preferred habitat for liquidity is: 
rates increasing when instruments’ maturity spans cash obligation dates, remaining 
abnormally high across the cash obligation dates, and declining back to normal after cash 
obligation dates pass.  The methods are similar in spirit to those of Griffiths and Winters 
(1997, 2005) and Kotomin, Smith and Winters (2008).  For each instrument and maturity, 
I estimate the following OLS with the White’s (1980) adjustment for heteroskedasticity:  
ΔRt = α0 + α1(ΔRt-1) + α2(ΔTBt)+ α3BYCR + α4AYCR + α5BYEND + α6AYEND  
+ b0Yrs0708 + b1(ΔRt-1)Yrs0708+ b2(ΔTBt)Yrs0708+ b3(BYCR)Yrs0708  
+ b4(AYCR)Yrs0708 + b5(BYEND)Yrs0708 + b6(AYEND)Yrs0708  
+ c0Yrs0911 + c1(ΔRt-1)Yrs0911+ c2(ΔTBt)Yrs0911+ c3(BYCR)Yrs0911  
+ c4(AYCR)Yrs0911 + c5(BYEND)Yrs0911 + c6(AYEND)Yrs0911+ εt       (1), 
where: 
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ΔRt  is the daily change (i.e., the first difference) in the yield of CD, ED, BA, 
or financial CP of given maturity, in basis points, 
 
ΔRt-1  is the first lag of the dependent variable, 
 
ΔTBt  is the daily change in the T-bill secondary market rate of the three- or six-
month maturity (whichever is closer to the maturity of the instrument 
being studied), in basis points, 
 
BYCR  is a dummy variable that equals 1 on the two trading days before the 
instrument’s maturity starts to span the end of the year and 0 otherwise 
(BYCR stands for before, year, and crossed), 
 
AYCR is a dummy variable that equals 1 on the two trading days after the 
instrument’s maturity starts to span the end of the year and 0 otherwise 
(AYCR stands for after, year, and crossed), 
 
BYEND is a dummy variable that equals 1 on the last two trading days of the year 
and 0 otherwise, 
 
AYEND  is a dummy variable that equals 1 on the first two trading days of the year 
and 0 otherwise, 
 
Yrs0708  is a dummy variable that equals 1 on all days in 2007 and 2008 (the crisis 
period), 
 
Yrs0911 is a dummy variable that equals 1 on all days in 2009 through 2011 (the 
post-crisis period). 
 
  The time subscripts for the dummy variables have been suppressed. 
Specifying the dependent variable as a first difference in rates allows the 
regression coefficients to be interpreted as daily changes in the yield in basis points. Also, 
using a change in the yield instead of a level is preferred because all the rate series are 
likely nonstationary (the null of no unit root is rejected for all series at high levels of 
confidence), while all the first difference series are likely stationary (the null of no unit 
root is not rejected for any series). The lagged dependent variable is included to address 
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autocorrelation in interest rate changes.4 The first four dummy variables are designed to 
measure the effects related to the year-end liquidity preferences. The last two dummy 
variables capture the crisis (2007-2008) and the post-crisis (2009-2011) periods.5 Each of 
these two variables is interacted with all other independent variables to determine 
whether the relations between yields of money market instruments and the explanatory 
variables changed during and after the crisis. The estimated coefficients of these variables 
(b’s and c’s) are interpreted as the differences from their pre-crisis counterparts (α’s).    
 The regressions capture the rate changes at break points for specific maturities but 
not the persistence of abnormal yields between these changes.  To address this concern, I 
plot average daily spreads calculated as follows. First, spreads between the yields of the 
studied private instruments and T-bill yields are calculated for each day in the sample. 
Some low-volatility observations have been deleted or inserted to ensure that every year 
has exactly 250 days (it was done only for the purpose of constructing the plots). Second, 
the average spreads are calculated for each day from 1 to 250.  E.g., the spreads on Day 




4 The estimation output of Equation (1) is not sensitive to the way the dependent variable is specified (e.g., 
a change in the level, a  spread over T-bill yield, or a change in the spread), nor to the presence or absence 
of the lagged dependent variable and T-bill yield changes on the right-hand side. To make sure that 
Equation (1) results are not driven by changes in the general level of short-term interest rates (i.e., T-bill 
yield changes), similar regressions have been run with daily changes in the term spreads between the yields 
of the same instruments as dependent variables (i.e., one-three, one-six, and three-six month yield spreads). 
The results are not affected. 
5 The crisis in the money markets started in the summer of 2007; only lower-quality instruments were 
significantly affected at that time. After the Lehman Brother bankruptcy in September 2008, however, 
short-term liabilities of even highly-rate financial institutions experienced spikes in yields. By the 
beginning of 2009, the money market rates in the U.S. mostly stabilized and volatility subsided. See, e.g., 
Griffiths, Kotomin, and Winters (2011) for a study of the U.S. commercial paper markets during the crisis. 
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IV. Empirical Results 
 Average daily spread plots and regressions constitute the primary analysis of the 
year-end effects.  The plots are used to determine if the spreads behave differently during 
periods preceding the year-end in which heightened demand for liquidity is likely, while 
the regressions test if statistically significant rate changes occur at the break points.   
Spread Plots 
Panel A of Figure I plots the CD over T-bill average yield spreads in each 
maturity. The intrayear spread behavior in all three maturities is consistent with the year-
end preferred habitat for liquidity in negotiable CD yields. The spreads are higher over 
the last one, three, and six month of the year (excluding the last two days) in the one-, 
three-, and six-month maturities, respectively. The pattern is the same as reported in 
previous research for maturities up to one month (Griffiths and Winters 1997, 2005; 
Kotomin, Smith, and Winters 2008); moreover, it appears to extend to maturities beyond 
one month. 
[INSERT FIGURE I HERE] 
 Proceeding to Panel B of Figure I, very similar patterns of spread changes emerge 
for EDs. This is expected because CDs and EDs may be close substitutes for large U.S. 
banks with access to international money markets.  
Panel C of Figure I plots intrayear average spreads for financial CP. The spread 
patterns for CP appear similar to the first two instruments, CDs and EDs. However, the 
CP-T-bill yield spread increases in panel C are less pronounced and not necessarily 
sustained through the entire period typically associated with year-end preferred habitats 
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for liquidity. For example, the three-month CP yield goes up relative to T-bill yield a few 
days before the CP maturity starts spanning the year-end (the spread rises from 53bps on 
day 188 to 67bps on day 195) but this increase is not sustained for long – the spread falls 
to below 50bps by day 206. This result suggests less pressure on financial CP yields prior 
to year-ends compared with CD and ED yields (possible reasons are discussed in the next 
subsection).  
Panel D of Figure I provides the plots for banker’s acceptances. BA yield spreads 
over T-bills behave in a manner similar to CD and ED spreads – the increases occur at 
the PH break points and are sustained. While BAs may be a relatively close substitute for 
CDs and EDs, banks do not have as much control over the volume of BAs they originate.  
The intrayear average spread patterns for CDs, EDs, and CP presented in Panels 
A, B, and C, respectively, are not due to the influence of the financial crisis or the post-
crisis period. Similar spread patterns emerge when the sample is limited to the pre-crisis 
period, 1991-2006. The impact of the crisis on the relations among CD, ED, and financial 
CP yields is discussed later in the paper.6 
Regressions  
Table 2 reports the estimation output of Equation (1) for different instruments and 
maturities. Examining these results allows us to determine if the yield changes apparent 
from the spread plots are statistically significant. To make the discussion tractable, I first 
 
6 To make sure that the plotted changes in the spreads are not driven by changes in the general level of 
short-term interest rates (i.e., T-bill yield changes), I also plotted term spreads between the yields of the 
same instruments (i.e., one-three, one-six, and three-six month yield spreads). These plots also reveal 
patterns consistent with the year-end preferred habitat for liquidity. E.g., the one-three month CD spread 
falls in the end of September when the three-month yield goes up due to the year-end effect, then increases 
in the end of November by more than it had fallen as the one-month CD experiences the year-end effect, 
and finally goes down to “normal” levels in the last two days of the year. These plots are not presented in 
the interests of brevity. 
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focus on the results for the pre-crisis period (denoted as the “base period” for each 
regression in the table) and then proceed to the crisis and post-crisis periods.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Pre-Crisis Period Results 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the CD yields in all three maturities increase on the 
second-to-last and the last day on which the CD both is issued and matures before the end 
of the year (i.e., the coefficient of the BYCR dummy is positive and significant). Because 
the dependent variable is specified as a daily rate change and each of the four indicator 
variables of interest (BYCR, AYCR, BYEND, and AYEND) covers two consecutive 
days in each year, their estimated coefficients are interpreted as yield changes in basis 
points on each of the two consecutive days covered by the dummy. For example, in the 
case of the one-month maturity, the yield tends to increase by 12.7bps on each of the two 
trading days covered by the BYCR dummy (the last two trading days of November) and 
decrease by 7.9bps on each of the last two trading days of the year. The yield declines 
further by 2.4bps on each of the first two days of the next year. The finding for the one-
month maturity confirms a similar finding in Griffiths and Winters (2005). In addition, I 
find similar patterns for the three-month (six-month) CD yields: the yields increase by 4.5 
(3.0) basis points on each of the last two trading days of September (June) and decrease 
by 2.8 (0.9) basis points on each of the last two trading days of the year. In the case of the 
three-month maturity, the yield continues to decline on the two days after the year-end. 
The 0.9bps decrease in the six-month yield on the last two days of the year is not 
statistically significant. 
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Panel B of Table 2 has the regression output for Eurodollar deposits. The 
estimated parameters are slightly larger in magnitude than their CD counterparts from 
Panel A. This result is consistent with CDs and EDs being close substitutes. In addition to 
the one-month ED yield, which increases by 16bps on each of the last two trading days of 
November and falls by 7.5bps on each of the last two days of the year, three- and six-
month ED yields also demonstrate statistically and economically significant changes at 
the break points: the three-month (six-month) ED yield goes up by 5.5bps (3bps) on each 
of the last two days of September (June) and goes down by 2.4bps (1.9bps) on each of the 
last two days of the year.  It is expected that the shortest maturity (one month) has 
stronger year-end effects, because clarity regarding year-end cash obligations increases as 
the year-end approaches and because more investors start planning for the year-end. 
However, I find statistically and economically significant effects even in the yields of 
longer maturities, specifically, three- and six-month CD  and ED yields, which is 
something not identified in prior studies. 
Estimated yield changes for CDs and EDs being the largest across the four classes 
of instruments studied is consistent with CDs and EDs (especially EDs, given the largest 
and most statistically significant estimates) being marginal sources of funds for large, 
internationally active U.S. banks. 
The regression output for changes in financial CP yields is in Panels C of Table 2. 
While the patterns are similar to those in CDs and EDs, there are several notable 
differences. First, the increase in the yields starts after the maturity of the instrument 
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begins to span the end of the year (i.e., in the two days covered by the AYCR dummy).7 
The yields do go down to “normal” levels promptly in the last two days of the year, 
however.8 Second, statistical significance is lacking in the yield increases in two- and 
three-month maturities, suggesting that these increases are too gradual to be captured by 
regression variables that cover only two consecutive days. (One cannot deny, however, 
that yield increases relative to T-bills are present: see Table 1 and Figure I.) The lack of 
sharp yield increases in maturities longer than one month is consistent with less pressure 
on financial CP yields for these maturities prior to the end of the year than on CD and ED 
yields. This lower pressure may be a result of several factors. 
 First, commercial banks tend to have increased liquidity needs prior to the end of 
the year, which is driven primarily by liquidity needs of their customers. Kotomin and 
Winters (2006) report that banks in the U.S. (in aggregate) experience large increases in 
demand deposits prior to the end of the year. These increases are consistent with bank 
customers preparing to disburse payments related to their year-end cash obligations. 
Kotomin, Smith, and Winters (forthcoming) show that the money flowing into 
transaction deposits prior to the year-end likely comes from non-transaction deposits and 
money market funds, as aggregate balances in these types of accounts fall prior to the end 
of the year. Kotomin and Winters (2006) show that banks respond to the changes in their 
deposit structure by increasing their holdings of liquid assets (cash and government 
securities). After the end of the year, the flow of funds is reversed: transaction deposit 
 
7 While the Fed Release H.15 labels the CP rates it reports as one-, two-, and three-month CP yields, the 
actual CP maturities are 30, 60, and 90 days, respectively. I do adjust the BYCR and AYCR dummies for 
CP to cover the break points for 30-, 60-, and 90-day maturities rather than for 1-, 2-, and 3-month ones. 
For consistency, however, I refer to CP as one-, two-, and three-month CP throughout the paper. 
8 The one-month CP results are in line with Griffiths and Winters (2005). 
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balances fall, and non-transaction deposit and money fund balances increase. Since these 
changes in the deposit composition are predictable, banks may start preparing for the 
temporary year-end increase in liquidity needs in advance by issuing liabilities that will 
mature after the peak year-end liquidity needs. On the other hand, finance companies (the 
largest issuers of financial CP), being non-depository institutions, may not face a large 
increase in the need for liquidity (or in uncertainty regarding liquidity needs) prior to the 
end of the year.  
Second, CP issuers place their paper either directly with investors or through 
dealers; they cultivate relationships with their lenders or dealers. Issuers that place their 
paper directly may be able to negotiate the rates with lenders. As to dealer-placed paper, 
Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) note that dealers in the CP market work closely with their 
clients and value these relationships because being a client’s dealer in the CP market 
often helps sell investment banking services to the client.9  
Third, CP issuers that are non-banks may have more flexibility when it comes to 
choosing the maturity of the paper sold due to lower year-end liquidity needs or lower 
uncertainty regarding such needs. They work with lenders or dealers directly in deciding 
on the maturities of CP to be issued, ranging from one day to more than six months.  
Panel D of Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients from running Equation (1) 
for BAs. The yield changes for 3-month and 6-month BAs are both consistent with the 
year-end preference for liquidity and comparable in magnitude with their CD and ED 
counterparts from Panels A and B. If a bank needs liquidity, it may sell BAs it has 
 
9 Starting in 2001, the Fed has reported volumes outstanding of directly- and dealer-placed commercial 
paper. Between 2001 and 2008, the proportion of financial CP placed directly was between 30% and 50%, 
hovering just over the 30% mark most of the time. After the financial crisis, the proportion of directly 
placed paper has dramatically increased. 
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originated in the secondary market, but the volume of BA originations depends on 
requests from the bank customers. BA issuance volume was not close to that of CDs or 
EDs even in the beginning of the study period when BAs were fairly common. Thus, BAs 
cannot be relied upon as a marginal source of funds for banks, while CDs and EDs can, 
and this is likely the reason why CDs and EDs exhibit the more dramatic yield and spread 
changes prior to the end of the year10. BA yield changes being consistent with preferred 
habitat for year-end liquidity is the result of different short-term bank liabilities being 
close substitutes of each other (Cyree, Lindley, and Winters 2007), not of BAs being a 
marginal source of funds for commercial banks. 
Crisis and Post-crisis Period Results 
There are several results worth discussing in this subsection. First, most yield 
changes show a positive correlation with Treasury bill yield changes prior to the crisis 
(1991-2006), indicating the yields moving together, and negative (or at least lower) 
correlation during the crisis (2007-2008) and often after the crisis (2009-2011), indicating 
the yields of T-bills and private instruments moving in opposite directions.  For example, 
the coefficient of the T-bill change for the one-month CD rate change is 0.24 in the pre-
crisis period, -0.33 during the crisis period (the sum of the coefficients 0.24 and -0.57), 
and 0.03 in the post-crisis period (the sum of 0.24 and -0.21). This is consistent with the 
flight to quality during the crisis. 
Second, the year-end preferred habitat effect appears to be stronger during the 
crisis period for two of the three maturities in CDs and EDs, but the differences are not 
 
10 When estimated over the BA data period (1991-1999) or the financial CP data period (1997-2011), CD 
and ED yield changes are still larger in magnitude and/or more statistically significant than BA and CP 
yield changes over the respective periods  (the results are not reported in the interests of brevity). 
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statistically significant. Since the crisis period is only two years, each indicator variable 
of interest only covers four days in total; therefore, even statistically significant 
coefficients should be interpreted with caution. 
Third, the year-end effect in CDs and EDs is completely eliminated after the 
crisis: the post-crisis coefficients of BYCR and BYEND are almost of the same 
magnitude but with signs opposite to their whole-sample counterparts’. For example, the 
3-month ED whole-sample BYCR coefficient is 5.5bps, and the post-crisis one is -5.3bps. 
Adding the two coefficients together suggests practically no increase in the 3-month ED 
yields on the days prior to the three-month maturity starting to span the year-end in 2009-
2011. This disappearance of the year-end effect in CD and ED yields is not surprising 
because banks in the U.S. have held extremely high amounts of excess reserves (by 
historical measures) starting in the fall of 2008. The aggregate excess reserves of U.S. 
depository institutions were $2bln in August 2008, $59bln in September 2008, $267bln in 
October 2008, and continued to grow afterwards, exceeding $1trln in November 2009 
and remaining above this mark through the end of 2011.11 Normally, banks would 
minimize their excess reserves and try to invest or lend the money and then borrow in the 
money markets (such as CD or ED markets) to cover any liquidity shortfalls, but the post-
crisis combination of increased risk aversion, extremely low market interest rates, the Fed 
paying interest on bank reserves starting in October 2008, and decreased lending 
opportunities caused banks to hoard cash in amounts more than sufficient to cover the 
increased year-end liquidity needs. Future developments will determine whether the year-
 
11 Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.3, “Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the 
Monetary Base”. 
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end effect will return to the money markets after the banking industry fully recovers from 
the consequences of the crisis and interest rates increase. 
Lastly, financial CP does not experience statistically significant changes in the 
year-end effect in most cases during and after the crisis. However, recall that the pre-
crisis effects in CP are often statistically insignificant as well. All the post-crisis 
coefficients in CP (both statistically significant and insignificant) are of signs opposite of 
their pre-crisis counterparts’, consistent with the disappearance of the year-end effect. 
 
V. Substitutability of Money Market Instruments before and after the Crisis 
Private-issue unsecured money market instruments all share key fundamental 
characteristics – low default risk, high liquidity, and short term to maturity. Therefore, 
they may be viewed by investors as close substitutes and have similar yields. For 
example, Cyree, Lindley, and Winters (2007) report average yields of the same four 
classes of instruments – CDs, EDs, BAs, and financial CP –  being close to each other 
over the period 1984 through 2000. High degree of substitutability also appears to be the 
case before the crisis in the data examined in the present study. Figure II plots the yields 
of three-month CDs, EDs, financial CP, and T-bills for the period 2006-2011. Before the 
crisis broke out in the money markets in the summer of 2007, the yields of the three 
classes of private instruments tracked each other very closely. However, private-issue 
money market instruments also have some credit (default) risk and liquidity risk. In a 
systemic crisis, a run by lenders is possible, and actually thought to have happened in the 
U.S. money markets after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. Figure II 
shows that the yields of CDs, EDs, and financial initially diverged in mid-2007 when the 
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crisis was first felt in the money markets and stayed separated through the end of 2007, 
then diverged again in March 2008 (after the Bear Stearns failure) and even more in 
September 2008 (after the Lehman failure). ED yields remained notably above CD and 
CP yields even after the worst of the crisis was over and all the rates seemingly settled to 
new, lower, levels. CD yields were notably above CP yields before May 2009 and again 
after May 2011.  
[INSERT FIGURE II HERE] 
For a more formal test of divergence of yields of the studied instruments, Table 3 
presents the results of the equality-of-means tests for the pairs of instruments that have 
data available through the end of the sample for the pre-, during-, and post-crisis periods 
– before 2006, 2007-2008, and 2009-2011, respectively. In all pairs of instruments and 
maturities, the differences between yields were statistically indistinguishable from zero 
before the crisis and were significantly different from zero, most of them at better than 
the 1% level (based on p-values of two-tailed t-tests) during and after the crisis. This 
pattern of yield separation suggests that the U.S. money markets have become more 
segmented as a result of the crisis, and that investors no longer view different private-
issue money market instruments as close substitutes of each other.  
First, financial CP yields have been lowest during and after the crisis. It is likely 
at least partially due to the fact that significant amounts of financial CP were guaranteed 
by the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TGLP) starting in October 2008 
through the end of the data period (in spite of many institutions opting out of the Program 
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by December 2008).12 Second, ED yields, which were equal to CD yields before the 
crisis, have been clearly higher than CD yields during and after the crisis. While the Fed 
does not report ED volume data, it is likely that the volume has declined after the crisis 
due to the U.S. banks’ increase in excess reserves and decrease in lending. In this case, 
only a relatively small subset of banks that needed to borrow short-term funds after 
exhausting other sources would participate in the ED market, making EDs a truly 
marginal source of funds for a bank.  
[INSERT TABLE III HERE] 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Previous research finds increased yields or spreads in maturities of up to one 
month in various private-issue money market instruments in the U.S. (Griffiths and 
Winters 1997, 2005) and in LIBOR for major world currencies (Kotomin, Smith, and 
Winters 2008). This study’s contribution is in the finding that U.S. private-issue money 
market instruments of longer maturities, specifically, three-month and six-month 
negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs), Eurodollar deposits (EDs), and banker’s 
acceptances (BAs), also demonstrate yield changes consistent with the year-end preferred 
habitat for liquidity prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Three- and six-month 
yields in these instruments increase before the instruments’ maturity starts spanning the 
end of the year and return to normal levels in the last two trading days of the year.  The 
yield changes of financial CP of maturities beyond one month, while generally consistent 
 
12 The instruments guaranteed by the TGLP were dominated by financial commercial paper and medium-
term notes. Monthly debt issuance and type of instruments under the Program can be found at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/reports.html (accessed June 23, 2012).  
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with preferred habitats for year-end liquidity, are less pronounced than in CDs, EDs, and 
BAs, and sometimes lack statistical significance. Financial CP issuers are dominated by 
finance companies, while the other three instruments are liabilities of commercial banks. 
Commercial banks’ liquidity needs are driven to a large extent by the liquidity needs of 
their depositors. Banks tend to see large increases in demand deposits (the most volatile 
category of deposits) prior to the end of the year, as depositors move money from less 
liquid deposit accounts and money market funds in order to make year-end cash 
disbursements (Kotomin, Smith, and Winters, forthcoming). Banks prepare for the year-
end increase in liquidity needs by holding (borrowing) more liquidity (Kotomin and 
Winters 2006). Finance companies do not have deposits among their liabilities; 
consequently, they likely have lower liquidity needs at the year-end than banks.  
In the three years after the financial crisis, 2009 through 2011, the year-end 
effects in CD and ED yields, which were both statistically and economically significant 
before the crisis, are no longer observed. It is consistent with increased holdings of cash 
assets by banks in the wake of the financial crisis and, consequently, reduced need to 
borrow in the money markets to cover liquidity shortages. CD, ED, and financial CP 
yields diverge during and after the crisis of 2007-2008, indicating that investors no longer 
consider these instruments close substitutes. 
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TABLE 1. Mean Yields and Spreads, 1991-2011. 
     
Obs. 
Mean Yields, % Mean Spreads over T-bills, bps. 
    Sample PH Non-PH Sample PH Non-PH 
1-month CD  5,236 3.63 3.65 3.63 37.2 56.9*** 35.4 
3-month CD 5,236 3.71 3.71 3.71 45.3 57.8*** 41.2 
6-month CD 5,236 3.82 3.80 3.84 44.9 48.3*** 41.5 
1-month ED 5,227 3.65 3.68 3.65 39.5 61.0*** 37.5 
3-month ED 5,228 3.76 3.77 3.76 50.3 64.1*** 45.8 
6-month ED 5,227 3.88 3.87 3.90 51.1 54.8*** 47.4 
3-month BA   2,252 4.92 4.99* 4.90 36.5 48.4*** 32.6 
6-month BA   2,252 4.96 4.98 4.95 27.9 32.1*** 23.6 
1-month financial CP 3,733 3.12 3.02 3.13 33.3 44.2*** 32.4 
2-month financial CP  3,700 3.17 3.28 3.15 36.1 42.5*** 34.8 
3-month financial CP 3,691 3.21 3.20 3.21 39.2 47.5*** 36.6 
3-month T-bill 5,236 3.26 3.13*** 3.30    
6-month T-bill 5,236 3.37 3.32** 3.42    
Note: Descriptive statistics are for daily yields of negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs), 
Eurodollar deposits (EDs), banker’s acceptances (BAs), financial commercial paper (CP), 
and T-bills, as well as spreads of the private securities’ yields over T-bill yields. The 
sample period is 1991-2011 for CDs and EDs, 1991-1999 for BAs, and 1997-2011 for 
CP. The spreads of one-, two-, and three-month yields are over the three-month T-bill 
yield; the spreads of six-month yields are over the six-month T-bill yield. 
PH stands for preferred habitat and covers the period of increased yields identified by 
Griffiths and Winters (1997, 2005) – from the second-to-last day on which the instrument 
is both issued and matures before the end of the year (e.g., the second-to-last trading day 
of September for the three-month maturity) through the third-to-last trading day of the 
year. Non-PH covers all other days. 
The asterisks in the PH columns indicate that the mean yield or spread during the year-
end preferred habitat period (PH) is statistically different from its counterpart on all other 
days (non-PH). 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
** significant at the 5%, level. 
* significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
TABLE 2. Regression Results. 
 
Panel A. CD Rate Changes, 1991-2011, in bps. 





Differences from Base Period Base Period 
(1991-2006) 
 
Differences from Base Period Base Period 
(1991-2006) 
 













Intercept   -0.06 -2.21* 0.04 -0.03 -1.71 -0.08 -0.03 -1.79** -0.12 
DV Lag     0.05** -0.19 -0.27*** 0.07** -0.58*** -0.17** 0.04 -0.33** -0.23*** 
ΔTB yield    0.24*** -0.57*** -0.21*** 0.27*** -0.58*** -0.01 0.41*** -0.82*** -0.17 
BYCR  12.73*** 15.96 -11.69*** 4.52** 5.51 -4.73** 2.95*** -1.79 -2.69** 
AYCR    0.38 -1.45 -0.15 -0.33 -5.25 0.78 -1.56* 5.32*** 0.00 
BYEND   -7.88*** -2.24 7.72*** -2.77*** 1.01 2.85*** -0.87 -2.47 0.19 
AYEND   -2.35*** -2.43 0.79 -1.71*** -3.47 0.27 -1.13 -9.83*** 0.89 
          
F-stat.    41.5*** 32.3*** 53.0*** 
Adj. R2 13.4% 10.7% 16.6% 
 
 
Panel B. Eurodollar Rate Changes, 1991-2011, in bps. 





Differences from Base Period Base Period 
(1991-2006) 
 
Differences from Base Period Base Period 
(1991-2006) 
 













Intercept -0.10* -1.48 -0.02 -0.05 -0.92 -0.13 -0.05 -0.69 -0.20 
DV Lag  -0.10*** 0.14 -0.23 -0.08** 0.43*** 0.03 -0.04*  0.30* 0.02 
ΔTB yield 0.17*** -0.27** -0.39* 0.17*** -0.25*** -0.30* 0.22*** -0.34** -0.26** 
BYCR 15.99*** 18.65 -15.87*** 5.49*** 21.67 -5.32*** 2.97*** -0.89 -3.20*** 
AYCR 1.76* -5.13 -1.34 -0.54 -8.11 0.89 -0.51 -0.47 0.21 
BYEND -7.54*** -8.31 7.51*** -2.44*** -5.04 2.54*** -1.86*** 0.70 2.12*** 
AYEND -2.03 -1.95 4.60 -1.07 1.12 1.20 0.22 -5.54** 0.04 
          
F-stat. 20.3*** 31.5*** 14.9*** 




TABLE 2. Regression Results (continued). 
 




Panel D. BA Rate Changes, 1991-1999, in bps. 
 





Differences from Base Period Base Period 
(1997-2006) 
 
Differences from Base Period Base Period 
(1997-2006) 
 













Intercept -0.01 -1.42 -0.08 0.00 -0.99 -0.20 0.00 -1.55 -0.21 
DV Lag  0.09 -0.53*** -0.56*** -0.02 -0.45*** -0.46*** -0.05 -0.28 -0.16 
ΔTB yield 0.19*** -0.05 -0.19 0.18*** -0.14 -0.30 0.17*** -0.31** -0.96 
BYCR 0.45 -2.14 0.62 -0.30 -9.59 2.03 -0.31 17.27*** -0.15 
AYCR 5.26* -17.96 -5.35* 3.85 5.55 -2.10 3.07 -6.96** -3.21 
BYEND -7.10** -6.60 4.44 -4.86*** -21.88*** 3.27 -3.95*** -20.85 0.96 
AYEND 2.17* 1.70 0.27 0.85 4.17 1.20 0.97 8.63** 4.66** 
          
F-stat. 44.3*** 51.4*** 49.4*** 
Adj. R2 18.9% 21.6% 7.4% 
 3-month 6-month 
Intercept 0.00 0.02 
DV Lag  0.01 0.01 
ΔTB yield 0.36*** 0.53*** 
BYCR 2.10* 2.45** 
AYCR 2.51 -1.87 
BYEND -5.19** -2.87** 
AYEND -3.48* -2.02 
   
F-stat. 81.3*** 147.4*** 
Adj. R2 17.6% 28.1% 
 
Note: Panels A, B, C report Equation (1) estimation output for changes in CD, ED, and 
Financial CP yields, respectively: 
ΔRt = α0 + α1(ΔRt-1) + α2(ΔTBt)+ α3BYCR + α4AYCR + α5BYEND + α6AYEND  
+ b0Yrs0708 + b1(ΔRt-1)Yrs0708+ b2(ΔTBt)Yrs0708+ b3(BYCR)Yrs0708  
+ b4(AYCR)Yrs0708 + b5(BYEND)Yrs0708 + b6(AYEND)Yrs0708  
+ c0Yrs0911 + c1(ΔRt-1)Yrs0911+ c2(ΔTBt)Yrs0911+ c3(BYCR)Yrs0911  
+ c4(AYCR)Yrs0911 + c5(BYEND)Yrs0911 + c6(AYEND)Yrs0911+ εt       (1). 
Panel D reports the results for BA yields, which, due to data availability, do not cover the 
crisis period and thus involve only the first seven right-hand side variables from Equation 
(1). 
 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
** significant at the 5%, level. 
* significant at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 3.  Mean Differences between Yields of Money Market Instruments before, 
during, and after the Crisis of 2007-2008. 


































CD yield,% 4.208 4.008 0.246 4.272 4.140 0.382 4.371 4.200 0.567 
ED yield, % 4.187 4.173 0.412 4.271 4.326 0.621 4.373 4.383 0.875 
difference, bps 2.1 16.5* 16.6*** 0.1 18.6** 23.9*** 0.2 18.3*** 30.8*** 
          
CD yield, % 3.915 4.018 0.246 3.972 4.259 0.375    
Financial CP yield, % 3.860 3.767 0.196 3.897 4.074 0.295    
difference, bps 5.4 25.1*** 5.1*** 7.4 18.5** 8.0***    
          
ED yield, % 3.896 4.181 0.412 3.965 4.404 0.611    
Financial CP yield, % 3.861 3.765 0.196 3.898 4.072 0.296    
difference, bps 3.4 41.5*** 21.6*** 8.7 33.2*** 31.5***    
Note: The mean equality tests were run on common samples (i.e., both series must have 
available data on a given day). This is a reason for discrepancies in the means of the same 
series in different pairs. CD and ED data are available from 1991 through 2011, CP data 
are available from 1997 through 2011. The p-values (not reported) are based on two-
tailed t-tests. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
** significant at the 5%, level. 
* significant at the 10% level.  
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Figure I. Average Intrayear Spreads between Yields of Private-issue Securities and 
T-bills. 
 
A. Average Intrayear Spreads between CD and T-bill yields, 1991-2011. 
 
 




Figure I. Average Intrayear Spreads between Yields of Private-issue Securities and 
T-bills (continued). 








Note: To construct the average intrayear spread plots, some low-volatility observations 
have been deleted or inserted to ensure that every year has exactly 250 days. For each day 
from 1 to 250, spreads between the yields of the studied private instruments and T-bill 
rates were calculated and then averaged for all years in the sample.  E.g., the spreads on 
Day 15 of every year are used to compute the average intrayer spread for Day 15.  
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Figure II. Three-month CD, ED, CP, and T-bill Yields, 2006-2011. 
 
